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Having gone over your post (previously I had just watched the video), you seem to be setting up your foundational words quite a bit differently than I use them. I want to understand your points, so I'll work through it. Fortunately I have your book to help! For instance, in addition to not thinking of "belief" as an act, I regard it as mapping to the mental state of how certain someone is about a proposition. So it would range from 0 to 100% just like probability itself. And in the "rational / correct" case would match the probability "warranted by" the evidence. So I'd typically say we CAN have "knowledge" of uncertain things (probabilistic propositions), in that sense. I think this conflicts with your model. And I need to think through necessary vs contingent vs knowledge. I'll try to understand your system and restrict future comments to concise questions about its meaning. Look forward to the next one.

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aon,

I say belief is an act , because beliefs are used as premises in Local Truths. And because we sometimes have to move from uncertainty to act. We must in these cases fill in missing premises with beliefs. This will make more sense when we get to decision analysis.

Yet you're right. My use of the language is a bit different than normal.

Thanks.

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Thanks for response. You're "belief" seems to map to how I'd use "bet". I might be misrepresenting your position, but it sounds like you are reducing uncertainty in the premises / argument by moving it to "belief as act" -> "assume premise is true". But an alternative would be to keep the uncertainty explicit as part of the premises?? Just pondering, no need to respond, I look forward to digging in further!

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